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a b s t r a c t 
There is an ever-increasing complexity of the systems we engineer in modern society, which includes 
facing the convergence of the embedded world and the open world. This complexity creates increas- 
ing diﬃculty with providing assurance for factors including safety, security and performance. In such a 
context, the AQUAS project investigates the challenges arising from e.g., the inter-dependence of safety, 
security and performance of systems and aims at eﬃcient solutions for the entire product life-cycle. The 
project builds on knowledge of partners gained in current or former EU projects and will demonstrate 
the newly developed methods and techniques for co-engineering across use cases spanning Aerospace, 
Medicine, Transport and Industrial Control. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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System safety considerations have a very long tradition. As
an early example, the classical bottom-up safety analysis method
FMECA ( Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis ) was devel-
oped by the US Department of Defense in the 1940s, and the
top-down method FTA ( Fault Tree Analysis ) was invented by Bell
Laboratories in the early 1960s. Guidance comes also from safety
norms since long ago; the generic Functional Safety standard IEC
61508 [1] was issued in 1998, and many others followed. None of
the functional safety standards, however, gave detailed guidance on
how to treat potential security risks. Security was, if at all, only
mentioned in a small remark. Instead, it was assumed that safety-
critical systems are separated from the outside world preventing∗ Corresponding author. 
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0141-9331/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uotential attackers from compromising them. Today, however, also
afety-critical systems are more and more integrated in networks
nd, thus, the old paradigm of isolated systems is not longer valid
e.g., Industry 4.0 [2] ), and attackers can target safety-critical func-
ions in a dangerous way. The risk is real as events like the at-
acks to the SCADA system at nuclear facilities in Iran [3] , the steel
ill attack in Germany [4] , or attackers causing power outages in
kraine [5] prove. Security considerations are therefore indispens-
ble also for safety-critical control systems. 
Moreover, there is an ever-greater complexity of the systems we
ngineer in modern society. This includes facing the convergence
f the embedded world and the open world. The complexity cre-
tes increasing diﬃculty to provide assurance for interrelated sys-
em quality attributes including safety, security and performance.
his is particularly the case for real-time systems where human life
s at stake such as in the transportation, aerospace, medical, and
ndustrial control domains. Safety and security interdependence,
nd with performance, is poorly understood not least because tra-
itionally different teams within the same organization have had
esponsibilities for safety and security. 
It is acknowledged that security is usually a requirement in or-
er to ensure safety [6] , but still standardization for safety andnder the CC BY-NC-ND license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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1 AQUAS Project Website: http://aquas-project.eu/ . ecurity is mostly separate. Safety experts and security experts are
raditionally regarded as distinct groups which “think differently”,
hey even “speak different languages”. This causes misunderstand-
ngs and lack of integrative treatment of interactions between dif-
erent quality attributes. Only since recently a couple of standard-
zation working groups have been tackling with the interactions
etween safety and security and they are for the ﬁrst time trying
o give guidance for this in new editions of standards. 
When deﬁning the architecture for a safety-critical system, the
esign has to care for both safety and security (e.g., safety and se-
urity in aerospace [7] ). A safety and a security analysis at the be-
inning of the development lifecycle yield additional requirements
or mitigation measures to keep the system suﬃciently safe and
ecure. However, mitigation measures targeted at safety may neg-
tively inﬂuence security, and vice versa. As an example, an addi-
ional diagnostic channel can improve failure detection and, thus,
afety. But, on the other hand, the diagnostic channel increases the
ulnerable surface and therefore deteriorates system security. Such
roblems need to be addressed in system development. Moreover,
lso other aspects play a role and can interfere with safety or se-
urity, like performance with respect to various properties, avail-
bility or reliability. For instance, Fujdiak et al. [8] investigated the
elation between performance and security in modern systems. In
ddition, there are speciﬁc aspects like human factors or the sys-
em use in the operation phase, which should be seen in context
ith different quality attributes. 
Modern systems require that we suﬃciently master the meth-
ds of dealing with the complexity of interacting system-level
ualities to build and maintain them effectively. It is therefore of
he outmost importance that we bring co-engineering into main-
tream practices. 
In AQUAS, the focus is on the following issues: 
• Safety/Security/Performance (SSP) considered together during the
overall life cycle of the products; 
• ﬂexibility across domains; 
• consolidation of the industrial market by reducing costs, in-
creasing system quality and maintaining compliance with more
and more exacting standards; 
• improvement of tool features and their capabilities for the pre-
vious points. 
The project has started on May 1st, 2017 and its duration is
hree years. 
This paper is an extension of a previous conference paper (i.e.,
9] ) that adds details about the description and the status of the
roject. Its structure is the following one: Section 2 highlights the
roject objectives, Section 3 extends the description of the main
oncepts and the adopted approach, while Section 4 (completely
ew) focuses on the expected extensions to the state of the art.
hen, Section 5 focuses on the selected application domains by
xtending their description and providing also the main project
esults currently obtained in the context of the considered use
ases. Finally, Section 6 presents main implementation issues and
ection 7 draws out some conclusions. 
. Project objectives 
Meeting the continuously growing requirements on security
nd performance, while maintaining safety, requires a coordinated
ngineering approach. Such a coordinated engineering approach,
aking available leading-edge design for Electronic Components and
ystems (ECS) technologies, will increase the competitiveness of
ey European industrial domains. This will be done by provid-
ng solutions for a holistic approach to Safety/Security/Performance
SSP) Co-Engineering (CE) through a domain-ﬂexible framework,
upporting the entire Product Life Cycle (PLC) and contributing totandards Evolution (SE). These three points represent the core ob-
ectives of the AQUAS project. More in detail, key outputs that we
xpect from this project are: 
• a global concept framework for SSP-CE: 
– based on an analysis of the needs of industrial application
domains; 
– giving support for balancing existing safety & security re-
quirements with application speciﬁc performance require-
ments; 
– consisting of established tools and platforms, which will
be upgraded to implement and test the co-engineering ap-
proaches and improved processes and methods; 
– considering the complete product lifecycle and inﬂuencing
the evolution of standards. 
• demonstrators derived from tools and best practices: 
– solutions for major co-engineering challenges will be tested
and evaluated in use cases; 
– improvement of tool capabilities to manage co-engineering; 
– improved ability for tool integration into the product life cy-
cle tool-chain; 
– ﬂexibility of tools supporting co-engineering across do-
mains; 
– improved capability of systems to recover from safety or se-
curity software and hardware problems; 
– the challenges faced and overcome fed back into the con-
cepts framework. 
• a public domain document at the end of the project describing:
– short/mid-term challenges still to be addressed for co-
engineering with recommendations; 
– identiﬁcation of the long-term challenges; 
– implications for Systems of Systems (SoS). 
• improved standards for dependability of complex systems: 
– positively inﬂuencing standards with feedback based on
the challenges addressed in the project and those foreseen
based on results; 
– where appropriate giving our tool providers a head start on
the market as the ﬁrst to offer support for new dependabil-
ity requirements from standards bodies. 
It should be noted that for standards the timeframe for com-
leting or updating is normally longer than the duration of a re-
earch project. Also, alongside the above objectives, a complemen-
ary action will be carried out looking at the transferability of the
o-engineering results to the case of SoS. 
. Concept and approach 
Safety, security and performance are interrelated concerns for
evelopers of dependable systems and for embedded safety-
ritical/related systems with hard real-time constraints. The AQUAS
roject builds on and extends the concepts and practices devel-
ped recently on design for safety and security (e.g., [10–13] ). 
AQUAS [9] is building momentum for industry to adopt signif-
cantly improved CE approaches that are applicable to the entire
LC across many domains 1 . The idea is to learn how the method-
logy can be applied in different use cases from ﬁve domains, and
hen derive a general approach with suﬃcient ﬂexibility to cover
ll relevant domains. The basic idea is to have quality attribute- or
spect-speciﬁc processes in parallel and analyze, after their com-
letion or partial completion, whether the results are compatible
r consistent. In AQUAS, we call this activity of analyzing the re-
ults of several processes an “Interaction Point” (IP). 
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Fig. 1. AQUAS PLC with separate/combined processes. 
Fig. 2. Illustration of safety, security and performance co-engineering through an interaction point. Consolidation points are represented as previous steps which are speciﬁc 
to a quality attribute. 
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tributes come together, is detecting whether the latest steps of re-
ﬁnement or implementation performed have violated constraints
or requirements established in previous stages, or have revealed
new conﬂicts among the various requirements of SSP that require
trade-offs, or backtracking to redeﬁning the trade-offs established
at previous stages. An example for such an issue is an encryption
algorithm introduced in order to support security, which, on the
other hand, increases CPU load and, thus, decreases performance.
This may cause a violation of the worst case execution time, and
thereby deteriorate safety. 
Many methods for combined analysis of safety and security
have been proposed since this need was ﬁrst recognized (see for
example the survey by Kriaa et al. [14] ), however, the main prac-
tical problems now concern the use by specialists in the differ-
ent communities, and the cost-effective integration in the PLC of
analysis methods and tools supporting these combined analyses.
The methodology an organisation applies here relates to how often
these combined analyses occur and how much can be automated. The point here ( Fig. 1 ) is that during the development lifecycle,
here will be points in time when the developers will take deci-
ions about how to progress with the development. These deci-
ions, according to the AQUAS proposed methodology, should be
aken with a holistic view on the system, i.e. account simultane-
usly for safety, security and performance. 
Fig. 2 illustrates an example of the process structure of an inter-
ction point in a ﬁctitious case. The interaction point is located at
he bottom of the ﬁgure. We illustrate also the possibility to have
revious “consolidation points” tackling the concerns of a speciﬁc
uality attribute in an isolated way by the experts on the analy-
is of this quality attribute (i.e., no safety/security/performance co-
ngineering). 
Fig. 3 illustrates the parallel processes for the different qual-
ty attributes (safety/security/performance) run through all stages
f the classical V-model, and even beyond it along the opera-
ions, maintenance and retirement stages. At certain points in the
ife-cycle, interactions are inserted between the quality attribute-
peciﬁc parallel processes. This can be done at the end of each
L. Pomante, V. Muttillo and B. K ˇrena et al. / Microprocessors and Microsystems 69 (2019) 54–67 57 
Fig. 3. Illustrative example of a product life cycle based on the v-model where the main stream cohabits with safety, security and performance streams. 
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a  tage, where a review is supposed to take place, but it can as well
e at other locations. 
The decisions at the level of requirements will concentrate on
eﬁning the preliminary architecture and the functional and non-
unctional requirements about the system safety, security and pos-
ibly performance (e.g., in case system response time is a concern)
bout the high-level requirements, apportionment of goals to the
omponents used in the preliminary architecture, etc. 
These initial high-level decisions ideally should be based on an
nalysis whether the safety, security and performance goals are
chievable together. The analysis will provide an insight about the
eeded compromises (trade-offs) between the goals and how these
ystem wide goals should be achieved by allocating requirements
n the properties (e.g., reliability/availability, security controls and
erformance indicators) to the components envisaged in the pre-
iminary architecture. At later stages of development, the initial
ecisions and allocation of goals and properties are subjected to
eﬁnements and each of the reﬁnements may serve as an inter-
ction point. If because of some reﬁnement signiﬁcant deviations
rom the previous allocation of the goals/properties are detected,
hen an interaction point will be triggered so that a new trade-off
s established between the assigned goals and component proper-
ies. 
The methods of analysis, which will be needed at each inter-
ction point, will be dependent on the context. We envisage that
he analysis will be supported by a range of tools appropriate
or the context. The tools will also range in terms of the level
f detail that they operate at: e.g., from tools for building and
olving probabilistic models such as Möbius [15] , which operate
ypically at system level, to tools suitable for more detailed anal-
sis, such as CHESS [16] , static analysis of the source code, etc.
e envisage that a combination of tools, provided by the part-
ers in the consortium, will be needed at most of the interaction
oints. 
This process of co-engineering for safety, security and perfor-
ance using interaction points requires a clear coordination be-
ween the personnel responsible for the concerns, which in turn
ay require organizational changes, e.g., delegating the combined
nalysis at interaction points to a ‘co-engineering’ team. Industry
o far has been quite reluctant to adopt a similar idea and the
silos’ (e.g., safety and security) are well established and diﬃcult
o overcome. If the organizational diﬃculty, however, is overcome
n part thanks to the improved tools facilitating the joint analysis iequired by the interaction points, then co-engineering promises
everal beneﬁts: 
• Despite the appearance that the process being iterative and
may require multiple interaction points of analysis with their
associated costs, we expect that some savings will be possi-
ble in comparison with having safety, security and performance
largely done independently. This hope is justiﬁed, as at least to
some extent avoiding duplication of the effort in analysis will
be possible when combined analysis is undertaken. In other
words, co-engineering offers scope for more cost-effective de-
velopment. The project will collect data on savings and share
them widely. 
• Applying combined analysis during the interaction points offers
scope for ﬁnding better trade-offs between safety, security and
performance, than would be possible if the analysis of safety,
security and performance is done by separate teams with lim-
ited communication between them. The fact that during the in-
teraction points a holistic analysis is applied will give the devel-
opers and managers higher conﬁdence that the found trade-off
is better than if the solutions were achieved focusing on a sin-
gle concern at a time, e.g. only on safety or only on security or
only performance. This conﬁdence will come from the fact that
the search for good trade-offs has been sought systematically
exploring the space of possible trade-offs of all three dimen-
sions safety, security and performance. 
• Finally, the concluding phase of a development is Validation,
which may include assessment and/or compliance with stan-
dards. The regimes for assessment/compliance vary greatly by
industrial domain with a number of relevant standards. If the
process of co-engineering is documented adequately, the out-
put from the analysis done at the different interaction points
will provide evidence, which can be fed into the validation (as-
sessment/compliance) activities according to the respective in-
dustry domain regime. For instance, building an assurance case
using the Claim, Argument, Evidence (CAE) framework [17] or
the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [18] , will naturally use the
results from the interaction points as evidence. 
This systematic generation of evidence and its direct coupling
ith the assurance case will contribute to its becoming a living
rtefact, capable of evolving together with the system and preserv-
ng assurance/compliance status. 
58 L. Pomante, V. Muttillo and B. K ˇrena et al. / Microprocessors and Microsystems 69 (2019) 54–67 
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s  4. AQUAS extensions to the state-of-the-art 
While trying to reach the objectives described in Section 2 , by
means of the approach described in Section 3 , the AQUAS project
will provide several results that will extend the state of the art in
the ﬁeld of Co-Engineering, Product Life Cycle and Standards Evolu-
tion . Such potential extensions are described in the following para-
graphs. 
4.1. Co-Engineering 
Safety, security and performance are important issues for criti-
cal systems in multiple domains. With an increasing trend towards
complex, open and dynamic highly automated and networked sys-
tems such attributes can no longer be considered separately. In or-
der to develop dependable Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPS) and SoS,
the mutual inﬂuences and constraints of each dependability at-
tribute and their interdependencies must be taken into account
through the entire development process. 
The increased relevance of safety- and security-co-engineering
with systems getting more complex and more networked has
found its way into standardization groups. To date, several stan-
dards which promote security-aware safety-engineering are avail-
able or in preparation. SAE J3061 ‘Cybersecurity Guidebook for
Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems’ [19] provides guidance for safety
and security co-engineering in the automotive domain and has
been used in the EMC2 project: the concept described in the SAE
standard is compatible with the safety and security interaction
point approach, which was already used in the EMC2 project, and
which provides a foundation for further elaboration and exten-
sion in AQUAS. In particular, we will look ahead at the upcoming
new Automotive Cybersecurity standard SAE/ISO/IEEE 21434, which
builds on and reﬁnes SAE J3061 and is intended to be compati-
ble with the Functional Safety standard ISO 26262. For the indus-
trial control domain, IEC 62443 [20–23] gives guidance how se-
curity threats for safety-critical control systems shall be treated.
The standard identiﬁes zones and conduits of different level and
elaborates on appropriate security measures, taking into account
safety risks for the determination of security levels. In addition to
IEC62443, IEC TC65 WG20 ‘Industrial-process measurement, con-
trol and automation- Framework to bridge the requirements for
safety and security’ is also working on the issue of safety and secu-
rity co-engineering. This new working group is looking into stan-
dards for safety and security for industrial systems from the in-
dustrial and other domains to deﬁne an applicable framework for
bridging safety and security. For the railway domain, a cyberse-
curity extension of the CENELEC standards EN 50128/29 and EN
50159 has been elaborated by the German Association of electro-
technicians VDE, named DIN/VDE V 0831-104, ‘Electric signalling
systems for railways - Part 104: IT Security Guideline based on
IEC62443’ [24] . The standard uses concepts of IEC 62443 and de-
mands an extension of the safety case to include security mea-
sures. 
The mutual dependence of safety and security has been recog-
nized by the research community for many years and in different
domains, for instance by Steiner and Liggesmayer [25] , Schmittner
[26] or Kriaa [14] . Several respective publications come from the
ITEA2 project “MERgE”, like Paul [27,28] , and Brunel [12] , and even
a targeted deliverable [29] is available. Likewise, previous work
was elaborated in the SeSaMo project with two deliverables in
the area of safety and security (namely, D2.1 – Speciﬁcation of
Safety and Security Mechanisms and D3.1 – Speciﬁcation of Safety
and Security Analysis and Assessment Techniques, both accessible
at http://sesamo-project.eu/documents ) and a number of publica-
tions, e.g., Popov [30] , Mazzini [31] , Born [32] , and Paulitsch [33] . One of the ﬁrst systematic studies how safety and security in-
eract on the requirements level was given in [33] . Requirements
an be contradictory and need resolving or requirements can be
aused by the other domain (e.g., from a “threat which can cause
 hazard” can follow a “safety-based security requirement caused
y a security and safety risk”). In order to identify this, a phase for
onﬂict resolution and integration of requirements was proposed.
s described in Section 2 , AQUAS is focusing on developing practi-
al co-engineering methods and tools for such shared activities and
nteraction points among safety, security and performance during
he complete Product Life-Cycle. While safety and security inter-
ependencies were already considered in projects like SeSaMo, Ar-
owhead, EVITA and EMC2, performance was largely neglected and
he approach towards security was mostly done on a case by case
asis. 
AQUAS will develop approaches, utilizing system modelling
echniques, for a security- and performance-aware design, devel-
pment and testing of safety-critical systems. This extends to the
perational phase, where systems need to scope with an increas-
ng rate of changes and updates which requires re-veriﬁcation
r increasing and updating the security. Tools which only sup-
ort, safety, security or performance will be extended to include
he additional dependability requirements and interconnected to
orm a holistic tool chain for safety, security and performance
o-engineering beyond existing safety & security co-engineering
aradigms. 
An overview of combined approaches for safety and security, fo-
using on analysis techniques and the industrial domain was pre-
ented in [14] . While these are useful ﬁrst steps, which are incor-
orated into AQUAS, it is necessary to look at the complete system
ife-cycle, deﬁne co-engineering points and identify, extend and
evelop methods and tools for each co-engineering point. Working
n a holistic system view, either with tools able to consider mul-
iple system quality attributes or with interacting tools will reduce
he necessary design concept iterations to balance safety, security
nd performance. Such holistic methods and processes make the
ffects of changes on other system quality attributes visible and
upport the detection of beneﬁcial and detrimental inﬂuences be-
ween system quality attributes. 
The AQUAS project will investigate all these different scenarios
n the earliest possible life-cycle phase, thus avoiding costly itera-
ions over several life-cycle stages or even overlooking critical de-
ign or implementation ﬂaws as a consequence of disregarding the
utual dependence. 
AQUAS will combine aspects of the uniﬁcation and the integra-
ion approaches. The balancing among approaches will be achieved
ot only by checking requirements but also by inherently com-
ined methods and tools. In addition, AQUAS plans the use of pat-
erns whose inﬂuence on the different quality attributes is known;
his allows an a priori correct design in relation to the different
oncerns. 
The AQUAS life-cycle model allows to keep the threshold for
dapting the technology low, encouraging industry to change to
he novel approach early because the risk is low. Established and
ell-proven tools can still be used, new tools for additional con-
erns can be added and processes extended with interaction points
nd shared activities. Despite of the ambition to establish a holis-
ic and comprehensive approach targeting the common treatment
f all relevant quality attributes, AQUAS is nevertheless open for
 smooth transition from well-introduced to novel life-cycle pro-
esses. Existing tools and established separate (i.e., parallel) pro-
esses for treating the individual quality attributes are joined at
he interaction points. It is expected that companies will initially
dapt the AQUAS approach with the yet separate safety, security
nd performance improvement processes. Team members respon-
ible for the single quality attributes will learn from each other,
L. Pomante, V. Muttillo and B. K ˇrena et al. / Microprocessors and Microsystems 69 (2019) 54–67 59 
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dlowly merge their knowledge and advance to experts for all qual-
ty attributes. With appropriate co-engineering tools coming up,
he parallel processes can be replaced by multiple concern-aware
ethods allowing further eﬃciency increase by avoiding the oth-
rwise necessary conﬂict resolution iterations between interaction
oints. Fig. 1 shows the choices how the processes between the
nteraction points can be designed. 
As mentioned above, AQUAS allows two alternatives for co-
ngineering, namely continuous integrated co-engineering as well
s concurrent engineering for treating the different quality at-
ributes separately with synchronization at the interaction points,
here the balancing is done. Osborne [13] describes approaches
or concurrent engineering taken in the Aerospace industry and
rovides examples from eight aerospace centers which are using
his technique. Here AQUAS has the potential to integrate smoothly
nd provide support in a domain with classiﬁed equipment and
ata and, thus, with the highest security requirements. 
As may have become clear, in addition to advancing general
pproaches for co-engineering, there are two particularly critical
spects. These are the product life-cycle and standards evolution,
hich due to their importance for realising co-engineering have
lso been set as project level goals. Co-engineering concepts are
aining momentum in standardization and will require methodical
nd tool support for realization. Our vision for these is described
n the next two sections. Co-engineering will be technically sup-
orted by tools interoperability using open standards as presented
reviously. 
.2. Product life-cycle 
During the nineties Product Data Management was an ICT
riven approach focused on product design data management.
owever the process has evolved to management of the product
ifetime meaning the processes and applications for the entire life
f the product and not just product design data [34] . The Prod-
ct Life-Cycle (PLC) is thus treating a product from the initial con-
ept all the way to disposal [35] . PLC management is intended to
e an integrated data and process metamodel in order to provide
odels for every stakeholder across the PLC. Usually it is a set of
rocesses, tools and models that cover certain stages, activities and
nformation. The set of processes, tools and models are used in a
hase to generate outcomes (models, ﬁles, etc.) to be used in the
ext stage and so on. 
A seminal paper on PLC [36] discusses the main life cycle stages
f a product, and it highlights the nature of the systemic approach
o the PLC. A product development should comprise, not only the
roduct development itself, but also other relationships such as
ustomers and providers interactions. In this sense, systemic ap-
roaches have been applied in order to develop a wide set of prod-
cts. There are some industrial experiences such as [37] where
lectronic design automation is used along a PLC. 
Some papers, such as [38] , outlines a structure for a so-called
LC Simulation System. From an industrial production perspective
e need to manage the value [39] generated among PLC stages.
his means that reuse strategies should be set up, among oth-
rs. Standards such as ISO/IEC/IEEE 26531 [40] also highlights the
alue of PLC, reuse strategies, and metadata and workﬂows con-
epts. Therefore PLC management is an integral part of total quality
anagement system [41] , and therefore it should take into account
uality aspects such as safety, security and performance. 
An additional beneﬁt from managing effectively PLC phases is
hat requirements changes are reduced [42] . Tests are considered
ne of the largest costs [43] . Therefore model based techniques
re suggested to manage, for example, test requirements through-
ut the PLC [44] . Product’s data management throughout the en-
ire life cycle [45] is also a key element in complex product de-elopments. This is especially relevant in safety critical scenarios
here methods are deﬁned in order to control requirements ﬂow
n PLC (e.g., [46] ). Other proposal are focused on project planning
ractices [47] for developing complex projects such as unmanned
erial vehicles. Modelling is relevant for managing PLC, and sev-
ral contributions are aligned with modelling data and resources
45,4 8,4 9] . 
A major focus of this goal is the better connectivity of the PLC
hrough its various stages with respect to co-engineering for sys-
em quality attributes. This means partners and use cases with a
articular competence (e.g., modelling) will be looking to improve
heir understanding of other stages (e.g., requirements, implemen-
ation) and providing linking mechanisms (tooling/conceptual) to
hese during the course of the project. The Standards Evolution
oal will reinforce work particularly related to the vertical aspect
f safety and security of the complete PLC. 
The PLC will consider and face these challenges from several
erspectives, especially when taking into account safety, security,
nd performance. These concepts have a direct impact on the
roduct life cycle of any company developing safety critical sys-
ems. Safety Engineering is a mature discipline and typically rig-
rous processes are applied, e.g., the V-model. More recently, ag-
le methods of different ﬂavours have been proposed and prac-
iced in safety related industries (e.g., the European Space Agency,
he Lean Development, etc.) However these concepts have been
idely studied separately due to the diﬃculty of integrating rela-
ionships among them but also because many domains have been
rusted in the past but are now increasingly open. Industrial ap-
lications use a wide diversity of PLC models taking into account
everal characteristics which are not standardised, and they are
ot systematically applied. Traditionally “ISO/IEC 12207:2008, Sys-
ems and software engineering Software life cycle processes” in-
icates and establishes a common framework for software life
ycle processes without taking special considerations of safety-
ritical development processes. In particular ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288
Systems and software engineering System life cycle processes”
eﬁnes four groups of processes: agreement processes, organisa-
ional project-enabling processes, project processes and technical
rocesses. 
In fact technical processes also highlight the need to deﬁne
ser requirements including safety considerations during the re-
uirement analysis process. Other guides such as [50] do not in-
end to ensure safety nor security aspects. These kinds of stan-
ards and guidelines do not prescribe any speciﬁc approach to
ackle safety, security and performance considerations at the same
ime in a coherent PLC approach. In AQUAS we propose a particu-
ar type of mechanism – interaction points – which is orthogonal
o any model of life-cycle and can occur at different stages of the
ife-cycle and allow for combined analysis to be applied and take
nto account simultaneously the concerns relevant for the particu-
ar development context. Interaction points are necessary through-
ut the PLC. In particular, security threats evolve during operation,
nd require re-analysis of system security and often changes to
lements of a system to restore it (e.g., to correct newly discov-
red vulnerabilities), sometimes with tight deadlines as changes of
hreat environment are unpredictable and may be such that op-
ration becomes unsafe. Both changes of threat environment and
ossible required system changes may have knock-on effects. E.g.,
 security “patch” may violate a performance requirement dictated
y safety requirements. However, current patterns of safety anal-
sis and documentation do not ﬁt this reactive, evolving, quick-
esponse model: they are typically focused on showing that a sys-
em is safe despite the threats posed by a static, non-malicious en-
ironment. Thus a challenge for AQUAS is how to ensure effective,
ﬃcient combined analyses at these interaction points that occur
uring operation. 
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s  One of the questions is where, in the timeline of the PLC, inter-
action points should be placed. Combined analyses could be con-
tinuously repeated every time that any of the development arte-
facts changes, giving a guarantee of spotting early any risk of vi-
olating requirements and any opportunity for optimization; but
this will not be cost-effective; if on the other hand much design
reﬁnement or change takes place without cross-checks, the costs
of backtracking if problems are found, or the opportunity cost of
missed optimization chances, may be large. The concern is anal-
ogous to what is sometimes called “technical debt” [51] : if rapid
software implementation is pursued without the software engi-
neering investment that makes for longer-term cost-effectiveness,
extra costs will be incurred in maintenance, late refactoring, oper-
ational failures. On the other hand, early over-investment is also a
risk, for instance if a product turns out to be short-lived. 
For co-engineering for safety, security and performance, the
limiting case, still present in some development processes nowa-
days, is that of no interaction points. The resources and design
precautions dedicated to ensuring adequate safety, security and
performance are decided early on, conservatively to give a good
chance of the ﬁnal product being adequate without any further co-
engineering activities (detailed joint analysis). The only veriﬁcation
that the requirements are jointly satisﬁed is at some phase of test-
ing the complete product, or even in its operation. The early con-
servatism gives good conﬁdence that the requirements will be in-
deed satisﬁed, paid for by a somewhat wasteful design. If require-
ments are not satisﬁed, often due to having not spotted some com-
plex interaction - for instance if security controls degrade perfor-
mance so as to violate system performance goals or to create safety
risks - then substantial re-work is required, and without combined
analysis this rework amounts to another trial-and-error cycle. 
We expect that the schedule of interaction points can in part be
decided before development, at pre-deﬁned points in the develop-
ment process used by a company (the AQUAS use cases will exper-
iment with this static scheduling of interaction points); while oth-
ers will need to be introduced reactively to respond to exogenous
change; for instance a decision to extend the operation of a prod-
uct to new environments or regimes of operation, or when dis-
covery of a vulnerability or unforeseen attack behaviour requires
updates of security controls. One critical PLC stage is the Disposal
Process, widely known as Decommissioning process, the purpose
of which is to end the existence of a system entity. This removal
implies several changes affecting requirements, the global architec-
ture, and maintenance and, at the end, stakeholders need to re-
vise their complete product life cycle. Another critical process is
the Integration process when different vendors aim to integrate
their solutions. Several assumptions are typically made by the re-
spective vendors when developing their own products and a type
of contract base can indicate that some assumptions are violated
or not. This is the point where the implicit contract under which
the product has been developed may be violated when the prod-
uct is applied in a different context. ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 speciﬁes a
set of technical processes and next ﬁgure outlines these processes
including a link safety, security and performance concepts from a
conceptual point of view. This integration can be done by mod-
elling Safety Cases (e.g., using GSN (Goal Structuring Notation)/CAE
(Claim - Argument - Evidence) tools) including facilities to deﬁne
and trace these concepts (safety, security and performance). For
doing this we can use the Opencoss platform [52] released under
Eclipse/Polarsys initiative. 
AQUAS aims at incorporating safety, security and performance
concepts in a common approach in order to reconcile and har-
monise them within a product life cycle in a safety critical do-
main. In this sense AQUAS investigates the relationships among
these concepts (safety, security and performance) and their rela-
tionships among standards such as ISO 26262, IEC 61508, or DO-78C. In addition AQUAS provides a product life-cycle model con-
aining analysis methods such as FMEA, FTA, HAZOP, HW-Metrics,
e-engineering of requirements using formal or semi-formal meth-
ds where/when possible, and the use of model based approaches
or safety assurance analysis including ‘safe’ code analysis (e.g.,
ests Generation Tools). A holistic product life cycle approach en-
bles a comprehensive development, considering system depend-
bility issues, and the use of statistics and applied probability
pproaches (e.g., stochastic model-checking techniques) confers a
easurement approach appropriate to safety, security and perfor-
ance. 
Finally the resulting product life cycle approach guarantees the
hole software development process integrity with respect the
equirements for a safety-critical application. This approach can
euse cross-domain, and skills and knowledge can be used from
ne domain into others. AQUAS results will impact evolving new
tandard editions, and communities such as Eclipse/Polarsys. 
.3. Standards evolution 
One of the most important AQUAS goal is to promote co-
ngineering standards derived from the project results by collect-
ng feedbacks and suggestion for evolution during the project and
rovide recommendations for improvements aiming at the stan-
ardization of co-engineering technologies focused on dependabil-
ty. It will help alleviating a major roadblock to co-engineering -
ittle or no presence in standards in turn has meant little drive
rom organizations to address this issue. A consequence of stan-
ardization for dependability is to enable assessment and certiﬁca-
ion; however the major focus of AQUAS will be the inputs to stan-
ards rather than the outputs from standards. We aim at having a
ubstantial impact on the mission-critical systems community re-
ucing costs and time for assurance and promoting migration of
ependable subsystems across multiple applications domains (e.g.,
vionics, railway, industrial automation, medical). This will include
spects enabling faster evolution whilst preserving prior certiﬁca-
ion. 
In particular, AQUAS intends to have an impact on the standards
or mission-critical systems where traditional safety oriented re-
uirements are being joined by new requirements for security and,
n specialized cases, also performance. The predecessor project
ESAMO has begun addressing these concerns with the introduc-
ion of ‘security informed safety’ in critical systems, and provides
 foundation of results that will be extended by AQUAS both in
epth and in dimension (i.e., addition of performance-related con-
erns) to be applied across several domains. 
The following is an overview of current governing standards
nd their status with respect to safety and security considerations.
.3.1. Cross-domain 
IEC 61508 (Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programm-
ble electronic safety-related systems) is the umbrella standard for
/E/PE functional safety applicable across a wide variety of indus-
ries. It is the basis for a number of domain-speciﬁc safety stan-
ards. The ﬁrst security related aspects have been integrated into
he last version 2.0 of the standard. IEC 61508 was the ﬁrst func-
ional safety standard taking into account security aspects partic-
larly in risk and hazard analysis phases and the safety manual.
ince November 2014 preparations have started for version 3.0 and
ore in-depth requirements and guidance to include cybersecurity
ssues with safety impact have been proposed and taken up to be
eveloped further by partners (AIT). 
.3.2. Performance and dependability 
IEC TC56, Dependability (formerly: Reliability), has recently is-
ued interesting drafts or standards covering the dependability
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S  spects of systems and open adaptive systems (AIT is member of
he national group VE EG56 for IEC TC56): 
• IEC 62853/Ed1: Open Systems Dependability (CD, comments
closed July 2015; it addresses particularly the “assurance
case”)); 
• IEC 62628/Ed1: Guidance on Software Aspects of Dependability,
• IEC 62741/Ed1: Reliability of systems, equipment and compo-
nents. Guide to the demonstration of dependability require-
ments. 
• The dependability case: this is of importance to AQUAS be-
cause the focus is here on general dependability properties and
not primarily on safety and security as in IEC TC65 and ISO.
Dependability is deﬁned as a quality attribute that “includes
availability, reliability, recoverability, maintainability and main-
tenance support, performance, and, in some cases, other char-
acteristics such as durability, safety and security”. 
.3.3. Cross-domains and cross-standards 
IEC TC65 started end of Oct. 2014 an Ad-Hoc Group 1 “Frame-
ork towards coordination of safety and security (in industrial
utomation and control)” which should provide recommendations
ow to further proceed in a coordinated manner with respect to
afety and cybersecurity standardization. The scope includes, but is
ot limited to, recommendations regarding the information secu-
ity of safety-related systems. A second recently founded IEC TC65
HG2 covers the relation between reliability and safety, thus clos-
ng the gap to IEC TC56, Dependability (AIT). 
.3.4. Ground transport domain (railway and motorway) 
The standard CENELEC EN 50129 covers the safety aspects of
he railway applications for communication, signalling and pro-
essing systems, while the CENELEC EN 50159 addresses the
afety-related communication in the transmission systems. An up-
ate of the CENELEC standard is underway (CLC TC9X WG14 Work-
ng Group for safety-related standards). For signalling between
raﬃc measurement equipment, traﬃc infrastructure on the mo-
orways and the traﬃc management and information system only
 directive is applied and realized: TLS 2002 (Technical Conditions
n Delivery of Roadway Section Control Units 2002). For security
urposes a regulation will be proposed for more secure signalling
ia SSL between road equipment in the forthcoming draft for TLS.
articularly VDE in Germany is just now working on an update of
hese standards taking into account and integrating requirements
f IEC 62443, SL 1 (Security Level 1) directly into the update pro-
osal for a new version of EN 50129 and EN 50159. 
.3.5. Air transport domain 
The Safety Regulation Commission for the EUROCONTROL
gency has recently published a body of European Safety Regu-
atory Requirements (ESARR) in order to develop, maintain and
romote common Safety Management policy, procedures, meth-
ds and tools for the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)
rea. SC-205/WG-71 is re-considering safety-critical standards for
erospace especially with respect to guidelines on the safe use of
odel-based development and leveraging veriﬁcation approaches
owards aircraft certiﬁcation. DO 178B (Software Considerations in
irborne Systems and Equipment Certiﬁcation) is a major standard
pplied by the Federal Aviation Administration. An update of DO-
78B (known as DO-178C) now exists. Multiple Independent Lev-
ls of Security/Safety (MILS) exists for security aspects. Comple-
entary cybersecurity standards have been issued just recently,
amely DO 326A/ED 202A ‘Airworthiness Security Process Spec-
ﬁcation’ and DO 255/ED 204 ‘Information Security Guidance for
ontinuing Airworthiness’, by RTCA SC-216, Aeronautical Systems
ecurity, in collaboration with EUROCAE WG-72. .3.6. Medical devices domain 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires that
anufacturers of medical devices establish and follow quality sys-
ems to help ensure that their products consistently meet applica-
le requirements and speciﬁcations. The quality systems for FDA-
egulated products such as medical devices are known as current
ood manufacturing practices (CGMPs). The ISO standards for med-
cal devices are covered by ICS 11.100.20 and 11.040.01. The qual-
ty and risk management regarding the topic for regulatory pur-
oses is convened by ISO 13485 and ISO 14971. The standard for
edical software is IEC 62304, the functional safety standard IEC
0601 which is referenced in the European Medical Devices Direc-
ive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993, revised 2007/47/EC. In context of
ospital information systems, networked devices and remote pa-
ient health monitoring cybersecurity is becoming a critical issue
s well. 
.3.7. Space domain 
The European Cooperation for Space Standardisation (ECSS)
ommission of the European Space Agency maintains the stan-
ards ECSS-Q-30, containing guidelines to perform failure modes
ffects and criticality analysis, and ECSS-Q-40 for the safety space
roducts assurance. The mere existence of two separated stan-
ards shows that safety and criticality analyses are treated inde-
endently. Furthermore, these standards are mere recommenda-
ions heavily subjected to ﬁnal interpretation by the user and the
ustomer. Present evolution in the complexity of space worth CPSs
alls requests the maturing of these standards to deﬁne a clear set
f tools and methodologies to be applied to guarantee the ﬁnal
erformance of equipment and to remove as far as possible the
ubjective part of the analysis that implies delays and overcosts in
ll the review points of a project; 
.3.8. Process industry and industrial automation 
IEC TC65 WG 10 and ISA 99 have issued the series of stan-
ards around IEC 62443 ‘Industrial communication networks - Net-
ork and system security - Security for industrial automation and
ontrol systems’, consisting of several parts with subparts, includ-
ng e.g., System security requirements and security assurance level,
atch management and Certiﬁcation of IACS supplier security poli-
ies and practices. This standard is taken as reference for cyberse-
urity in industrial systems and in several functional safety stan-
ards. 
.3.9. IEC TC44, safety of machinery, electro-technical aspects 
Considerations how to take care of cybersecurity in context of
achinery safety have started: 
• cybersecurity shall not interfere with the safety objectives of
the plant and shall protect their realisation; 
• for functional safety in the automotive domain ISO 26262 is
relevant. In January 2015 at the meeting for Ed. 2.0 proposals
were made for ‘Consideration of security concerns in ISO26262’
which is becoming of importance taking into account develop-
ments like ‘connected cars’, ‘highly automated driving includ-
ing V2V, V2I communication’ and ‘autonomous vehicles’. This
was taken up and has become part of the DIS. In the meantime
there is a new work item on Automotive Cybersecurity engi-
neering. 
Partners of the AQUAS consortium are members of several com-
ittees and very engaged to inﬂuence standards by promoting rel-
vant project results to be reﬂected in the standards. 
Further on, involvement in related ARTEMIS projects (SESAMO,
MC2, ARROWHEAD) and standardisation support actions (ProSE,
P-SETIS) and (pre-) standardization working groups (ARTEMIS
tandardization WG, EWICS TC7) is supporting this goal. Our work
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o  with standards evolution is also a crucial contribution to Cyber-
Physical Systems of Systems (CPSoS), who need standardization in
order to control the autonomy of management and operations.
As an example, the ISO 15288 standard on Systems Engineering
has much to say about SoS, but is known to be weak on extra-
functional properties. AQUAS members intend to provide change
request inputs for this Standard, among others. 
Indeed, a key contribution of AQUAS will be to advance, where
relevant, a combined approach for standards beyond the current
state of the art. This will be done by evolving the concept and
practice of the security informed safety case with impact on per-
formance taken into consideration. As described in the Concept
section, joint evidence gathered on security and safety through co-
engineering activities will feed into the continuously maintained
assurance case, which tracks the evolution of the system and main-
tains its dependability status. This procedure for constructing and
maintaining the assurance case will be integrated seamlessly into
the product life-cycle deﬁned in AQUAS, taking into particular con-
sideration the interaction points at which intense co-engineering
activities are carried out. Much of the evidence will be directly
generated by the AQUAS tools (e.g.formance analysis results from
the CHESS toolset). 
The results of these improvements in the non-functional devel-
opment process will be directly measurable through observation
of the capabilities of the AQUAS tools and life-cycle activities to
generate automatically the evidence needed to prove their signif-
icance for standardization. Note that this decouples the measure-
ment process from the actual evolution of the standards (which
can be slow and unpredictable) and makes it objective and achiev-
able as a concrete result of the project. 
5. Domain environments to realize project goals 
Co-engineering techniques and tools for safety-security-
performance have yet to signiﬁcantly take off for a variety of
reasons described in previous sections. AQUAS aims to bridge
the many resistances between specialists domains and bring
co-engineering into mainstream practice. Demonstrators from
across many domains are key for the leverage needed to achieve
this and to prove validity and value. AQUAS has ﬁve domainss illustrated in Fig. 4 which, like the consortium, were selected
or balance (there were initially 12 proposed use cases), with
iffering focal points in the product life cycle. They cover transport
nfrastructure, health, satellite systems and manufacturing. All
se cases are based on CPS and at least two of them (i.e., Air
raﬃc Management, Railways) deal with the design of typical
constituent systems” of SoS. Also, some SoS concerns (e.g., long
ifetime, evolution after entry into service, multiple stakeholders)
re shared by all ﬁve domains. The demonstrators are described in
he following sections. 
.1. Air traﬃc management 
This use case focuses on the provisioning of surveillance ser-
ices to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) that operate on very low-
evel airspace and third parties such as law enforcement. The ad-
ances in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and their numerous ap-
lications have contributed to the increasing air traﬃc density over
he last years. Improvements in air traﬃc management are needed
o address the need for appropriate situational awareness and re-
uired safety levels. In shared airspace, UAVs cannot always re-
ort their presence using standard means (e.g. ADS-B - Automatic
ependent Surveillance Broadcast) due to various reasons such as
ower constraints. An appropriate situational awareness can only
e attained by the cooperation of ground services with airborne
pplications, as information on every surrounding aircraft will not
e available at either side alone. The proposed approach in this
se case promotes sharing UAV missing parameters (coordinates,
eading, speed, etc.) using a data distribution system (DDS) mid-
leware implementation based on the requirements of the exist-
ng System Wide Information Management (SWIM) [53] infras-
ructure. UAVs following this approach would mutually beneﬁt by
reating an using this common knowledge. By additionally leverag-
ng current air traﬃc coordination services offered by governmen-
al and trans-national agencies (such as the US FAA and Eurocon-
rol), it is feasible to determine the presence of hidden traﬃc, thus
ncreasing awareness of potential conﬂicts that would remain un-
nown otherwise. The current results show that the introduction
f AQUAS methodology and tools in the current work methodol-
gy can reduce the effort and improve the quality of the use case.
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b  he next AQUAS potential beneﬁts for this use case are support for
enerating input data for unit testing, support for schedulability
nalysis with realistic platform models, support for platform par-
itioning, support for generating system-level test inputs and out-
uts for exploration testing, support for conﬁrming the absence of
afety violations and support to design better security controls e.g.
y identifying compromising situations. 
.2. Medical devices 
A neuromuscular transmission (NMT) device is developed to
upport the anesthesiologist in controlling muscle relaxation dur-
ng hospital operating room interventions. Muscle relaxation, depth
f anesthesia, and pain are the three key parameters to be con-
rolled by the anesthesiologist. The challenge is to develop a
losed-loop controller for muscle relaxation that performs in au-
omatic pilot mode. The use case hardware consists of two main
omponents, an NMT monitor and a pump tree. The goal is to keep
he muscle relaxation at the required level at each stage of the
peration by delivering the right amount of drugs to the patient.
he system requires diagnosis and therapeutic capabilities to en-
ance patient care and safety. When interfacing the system to a
ospital information system security issues arise. Experience val-
es show that the effort for safety and security veriﬁcation and
alidation to reach the required safety and security levels is enor-
ous. Within AQUAS, SSP shall be considered during the develop-
ent life-cycle by various measures, such as modeling control soft-
are in the NMT controller hardware to reduce development time
nd costs, modeling the patient, applying tools for veriﬁcation and
alidation to gain performance evidence in test cases that cover
ost possible real situations in real life, and securing the com-
unication between the different components making them robust
nd not prone to compromising the integrity of the system. In this
ontext, important standards are IEEE 11073 [54] (related to the
nteroperability between medical devices), EN 62304 [55] (related
o software development of medical equipment), and EN 60601-
-10 [56] (related to closed-loop control systems). A goal is that
y applying combined analysis methods for SSP evidence for as-
urance cases is systematically created. This will contribute to the
ystem becoming an artifact capable of evolving whilst preserving
ts assurance/compliance status. Currently, this use case shows ev-
dence of development of a ﬁrst test platform that will allow to
ield results and test evaluations. It will also show partner’s tech-
ology considered by this Medical Devices use case as the spinal
olumn to include operational tooling with Co-Engineering and
ool interoperability means. 
.3. Rail carriage mechanisms 
The opening and closing of Platform Screen Doors (PSD) in-
talled in metro stations must be controlled in ways that en-
ure passengers protection. Actual implementations of PSD systems
ave a short delay of 300 milliseconds and operate independently
f train signaling and automatic operating systems. Safety is of ut-
ost importance with Safety-Integrity Levels (SIL) often reaching
evel 3 and 4. PSDs are deployed widely for either upgrading exist-
ng lines or establishing new, usually driverless, metro lines. Such
ystems are operated remotely, which imposes the need for se-
urity measures next to safety. Railway system functions are also
ime-critical, which leads to the need of tools and methods to an-
lyze cross-effects between SSP. Hardware and software are devel-
ped in conformance to EN 50126 [57] and PSD systems require
arious sensor subsystems (e.g., radar, laser, infra-red, etc.), pro-
essing functions and actuators, and have a development cycle that
s usually between six and twelve months. In general, each devel-
ped system is new, which makes it hard to reuse parts for de-ign and development. Major goals of the use case within AQUAS
re to reduce the time needed for the development cycle and to
uarantee cost reduction by limiting unexpected behaviors at ad-
anced stages in the PLC. At the current stage of the use case
he work ﬂow concerning safety and performance does not suf-
er heavy changes, but the ability to detect and reason about in-
eraction points can greatly help anticipating the potentially costly
odes. Also, the AQUAS methodology eases signiﬁcantly the intro-
uction of new categories. The current focus lies on safety, security
nd performance, but any new category (ergonomics or process
onstraints for instance) could be introduced in the same meta-
ramework. 
.4. Industrial drive 
Motion Control products cover a large variety of variable fre-
uency inverters for synchronous and asynchronous motors rang-
ng from standard electric motor systems and servomotors for Mo-
ion Control applications including linear and torque motors to
otors for use in hazardous explosion areas, to high voltage, DC
nd customized electric motor systems. The large variety of com-
unication and sensor interfaces of such embedded systems adds
igniﬁcant security challenges to the safety mechanisms already
mplemented in commercial industrial control products, where the
ost relevant standards are IEC 61508 [58] , IEC 61800 [59] and IEC
2443 [60] . Besides safety and security, also real-time performance
s an essential criterion within this cost driven and competitive
omain. Finding the right balance between these attributes while
taying within tight budget constraints is a challenge for this use
ase. This makes the Industrial Drive a relevant demonstration ex-
mple for the technology developed within AQUAS. The approach
aken is based on Virtual Prototyping. Even though virtual HW pro-
otyping for SW development is common industrial practice, its us-
ge for veriﬁcation of safety features is not yet state of the art. In
QUAS, a seamless ﬂow from System Level Model to the Virtual
W Prototype will be investigated with main focus on early con-
ept validation. One of the major goals was to seek and manage
ependencies (interferences) between requirements, thus detect- 
ng potential conﬂicts between safety/security/performance. At the
urrent stage, a spreadsheet-based method for identiﬁcation, man-
gement and reduction (of the huge number) of potential interfer-
nces of requirements was developed. This approach will undergo
eﬁnement accompanied by some tool support for automation. 
.5. Space multicore architectures 
Spaceborne missions have very strict requirements on perfor-
ance under critical conditions, as well as on other system quality
ttributes such as safety and security. The validation procedures
or such systems are long and there is also a lack of tools and
ethodologies that allow quick exploitation of technology. This
akes it hard for new technology to ﬁnd its way into space ap-
lications (e.g., multi-processor architectures and Systems-on-Chip
re still being seen as newcomers in this domain). The use case
ocuses on the payload of an earth observation space project by
pplying a multicore architecture for video processing equipment.
SP requirements are derived from actual mission scenarios. The
eﬁned architecture should enable in-ﬂight reconﬁguration with
ew versions of software and hardware (SW modiﬁcations for a
EON processor-based architecture or FPGA reconﬁguration). One
ajor goal is to replace legacy design systems with multicore ar-
hitectures to improve performance. Parallelizable video compres-
ion algorithms that are commonly used in space domain will
e taken to test the performance of the system. A possible core
or the architecture is the LEON3FT [61] , which will be used as
ase to implement the Scalable Sensor Data Processor Breadboard
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a  architecture. The use case must support compliance to the Eu-
ropean Cooperation for Space Standardization (ECSS) family of
standards for Space Software (ECSS-Q-ST-80C [62] and ECSS-E-ST-
40C [63] ). The tools and methods developed in AQUAS should
show an impact on certiﬁcation and validation of the algorithms.
Currently, the relevant interaction points are being elaborated in
their respective PLC phase and that will potentially lead to trade-
off decisions for the design. The demonstrator SW is composed by
the Boot SW and the Application SW, this last one is the subject
of study in AQUAS. A safety-security-co-design was done by code
developers, trying to consider during design phase the needed se-
curity features with the design of safety-oriented risk mitigation
mechanisms. The application software is implemented with a real-
time operating system toolchain. The schedulability of the whole
software is analyzed with tools specialized on timing analysis in
order to check if security features do not negatively inﬂuence the
performance. 
6. Implementation 
6.1. Work plan - Work packages, tasks and interactions 
The work structure and responsibilities of AQUAS are broken
down into work packages (WPs) and tasks. Although AQUAS con-
templates a number of ﬁve different Work Packages (WP), the
project diverges from the traditional Concept/Tool/Demonstrator
WP structure to encourage a more collaborative and use case
driven environment. Consequently, the demonstrators do not form
part of any WP in particular but represent a result of a joint work
among WP 2, 3 and 4. This bottom-up approach is depicted in
Fig. 5 . WP2 on Application Domains is in charge of demonstra-
tor management including the use case deﬁnitions, requirements,
analysis, and testing of different technologies. It comprises a num-
ber of use cases corresponding to 5 application domains includ-
ing air traﬃc management, railway, industrial drive, health, and
space. Methodology and Design tool providers contribute to the
demonstrators through their work in WP3 on Methodology and
WP4 on Design Tooling. Both project management and technical
coordination are performed in the scope of WP1 on Project Man-
agement whereas WP5 on Exploitation and Dissemination takes
care of spreading the AQUAS outputs internationally and ensuring
the uptake of the obtained results. Fig. 5. Interaction betwe.2. Consortium as a whole 
The initial impetus for the AQUAS consortium formation came
rom the projects SESAMO [64] and MERGE [65] each having tasks
peciﬁc for co-engineering. Coming from these projects a deci-
ion steering committee (DSC) was formed with two members
rom each Project. The DSC has been charged with taking votes
n proposal direction and consortium constitution to maximize the
roject effectiveness in achieving our results. 
Co-engineering needs a technology rupture to pull away
rom the traditional compartmentalized engineering approaches. It
eeds long-term sustainable support, which is diﬃcult across in-
ustry (where goals can change every 3–4 years as people change
obs). There is also a need to have a suﬃcient critical mass of orga-
izations working together with this objective to push the market
n the right direction. 
The demand for co-engineering solutions is increasing rapidly
s evidenced following a brokerage event with over 60 organiza-
ions wishing to participate in such a project. To ensure optimum
ohesion with the project goals, whilst also gathering suﬃcient or-
anizations together, it was believed that the Consortium should
ot pass 25 partners. A short questionnaire was circulated request-
ng data about each organization’s background and work interests
ithin the scope of AQUAS. The DSC evaluated replies and selected
artners to balance: 
• research, SME, industry 
• safety, security and performance expertise 
• tools, concepts and use cases 
• product lifecycle expertise and positioning 
• ability to affect standards 
• management capacity 
• the scope of domains they could address 
Moreover, to an extent the motivation and organizational ca-
acity has been considered. The target number of AQUAS partners
as achieved with a good distribution of expertise and work inter-
sts. Today, the AQUAS consortium gathers 23 institutions includ-
ng academy, research institutions and industry from 7 European
ountries. 
With this fair balance, the next driving factor has been the
ntegration of all the organizations. This commenced by fusing
nd distributing the initial information from the organizations en-
bling everyone to review the expertise of other partners anden Work Packages. 
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 dentify their synergies, particularly with the use cases. Given co-
ngineering for safety, security and performance covers a vast
pectrum of domains and disciplines, this phase was important for
dentifying exactly where our strengths lay and to generate reﬁned
bjectives based on the project goals. 
Not only the size of the Consortium was limited. The same was
one with the number of applications domains. Maximizing im-
act is a trade-off between advancing in a suﬃcient number of do-
ains, whilst keeping a suﬃcient number of partners in each do-
ain to build momentum. The selection of the use cases was based
n their work focus alignment with the competence of other part-
ers as well as on having suﬃcient domain diversity and coverage
f the three core goals. Partners’ expertise has also been carefully
ligned with the needs of the use cases. 
Of equal importance to having suﬃcient spread across domains
s having a suitable partner distribution across Europe. The spread
f partners is shown in Fig. 6 . Having cooperation across European
ountries is essential for bringing the practice of co-engineering
nto the mainstream development processes. This form of collab-
ration is intended to ensure building momentum on the markets
f these countries. 
. Conclusions 
This paper has presented the AQUAS ECSEL JU project. It inves-
igates the challenges arising from the inter-dependence of safety,
ecurity and performance of (sub)systems and components and
ims at eﬃcient solutions for the entire product life-cycle. The
roject builds on knowledge of partners gained in current or for-
er EU projects (e.g. [66,67] ) and demonstrates the newly con-eived approaches to co-engineering across use cases spanning
pace, Medicine, Transport and Industrial Control. 
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